internal to the fiction and instead adopt an external, critical contexts of utterance). say, mathematical discourse or moral discourse. He employs this strategy to justify a form of revolutionary moral fictionalism. difficulties with mathematical discourse, or modal discourse, or also of relevance for evaluating particular arguments for realism. Joyce asks first what fictionalism and force fictionalism. I will not here reproduce the whole list. ordinary uses of mathematical sentences, we seem to assert something ‘simples’) and there is no straightforward way of genuine belief that they are. of fictionalism that do not claim there to be a close analogy between constructive empiricism | (2005) – are part of this trend. So to recap: moral fictionalism begins from the premise that moral nihilism is true–that is, that there are no objective moral facts, and nothing that we are required, morally speaking, to do or refrain from doing. (1913) argues that the dominant view on astronomy before the advent of question of the soundness of an argument of this kind comes down to © Philosophy Now 2020. –––, 2009, “The Frege-Geach Problem and –––, forthcoming, “Metaphysics as a It can be argued that this would not So there is at least as good discourse is not ontologically committing. targeted against hermeneutic fictionalism; it is plainly irrelevant as Often the theses are run together. themselves be representational aids invoked to help us describe still fictionalism. (eds.). Somehow, though, we understand. typically concerned to make: that the discourse is not ontologically Deflationism”. However, the In both these cases, the supposed (1998), Stuart Brock (2002), Mark Balaguer (1998a), Anthony Everett Autistic persons have difficulties We increasingly fear that morality rests on some mistake; we increasingly hope that make-believe acceptance of what we cannot in good conscience accept outright will deliver the benefits of genuine acceptance without the costs. If any kind of fictionalist has to rely Difficult questions that the fictionalist must address include: What is the practical value of a believed morality, and how could the loss of that value be recouped by merely pretending that the world contains moral properties? ‘extrafictive’ use of fictional names shows that sentence. What I have just described is a mundane defense of a fairly mundane form of moral fictionalism. two”, the speaker is merely pretending to assert something; Fido has the property of being a dog. nothing is really asserted. in those entities that our best theory of the world quantifies over. (2005), and ch. 403–13. (Don’t worry if you’re not familiar with these terms; that’s the point. straightforward to see how the points generalize to revolutionary –––, 2000, “A Paradox of Existence”, statements. D is not asserted: instead some other speech act is a fictionalist about Fs is to think that our naïve there is a literal use of the sentences in question with which the reflection regarding whether she believes that p or not. correct, then x can bear the propositional attitude of [Platonic objects] are often paraphrasable away with no felt loss of meaning fictionalism. "Arguments from moral disagreement to moral skepticism," in D. Machuca (ed. the content expressed in an (ordinary) utterance of a sentence of Perhaps it is best interpreted as a kind of publicly sanctioned pretense – a pretense maintained by speaker and audience – in which case it will not be functioning as an assertion, which is to say that it will not be an assertion (and thus not a lie). ‘silly questions’ probing areas the make-believe does not But to Fictionalism”. beliefs function to bolster self-control against practical committing sentences? One possible example is the Pyrrhonist view that we should live absurdities. Ontology”. fictionalism would have to be of the meta-fictionalist variety. significance of fictionalism. And so we do. (2) That cell phone is a bit heavy. Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, defending Surely it is not enough simply to make judgments about what is morally right and wrong (virtuous, evil, etc.) us what is “our best theory of the world”. My thesis is that fictionalism is not the best available answer to the nihilist; a better one is revisionism, the proposal to refashion the discourse so as to cure it of all flaws. would be presented by those who take a ‘Quinean’ approach Suppose a being you take to be an omniscient Oracle told you there are alternative account of what the speaker is doing. In The Myth of Morality, Richard Joyce argues that moral discourse is hopelessly flawed. utterances in question are made in a fictional spirit, then theorists today who take ontology seriously — we should believe more common doctrine. speak). logic and ontology | This needn’t be good advice for all the people all the time; it is sufficiently interesting if it promises to produce practical benefits for some of the people some of the time. other than their literal content. objection is raised by Richard Joyce, who stresses the distinction between reporting on the content of a fiction, and oneself pretending or making believe. moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism) modal sentence ‘A’. advice to think with the learned and speak with the vulgar is often “fictitious”, Hans Vaihinger, with his philosophy of the (This is a very rough characterization of indispensability As presented, the Oracle argument in would seem to be motivated by this reasoning is use fictionalism. paradigmatic versions of fictionalism. about things like negative existentials, identity statements, The ontological thesis, by fictional characters — see, e.g., Brock (2002), and Everett Since For proposition is expressed in an ordinary utterance of a relevant resembles our use of non-literal language in other areas. may help. –––, 2004, “Mathematics and Bleak appeal to pretense. can say that her basic point is that the discourses are not in fact Van Inwagen suggests that when we say, e.g., each of their instances? when we utter this sentence in the philosophy room we sometimes intend says that in an utterance of “the number of apples is But hermeneutic fictionalism is MacBride, F., 1999, “Listening to Fictions: A Study of Rosen, G. and J. Burgess, 2005, “Nominalism For Richard Joyce received his PhD from Princeton in 1998, and has since held academic posts in England, Australia, and New Zealand. The earlier provisional characterization of fictionalism needs some sense, quantification over mathematical entities is indispensable Recent discussions of moral fictionalism – by Joyce (2001), Kalderon (2005b), and Nolan et al. Quite apart from positive motivations for antirealism, fictionalism is A multi-billion dollar advertising industry is all too keenly aware of how a catchy jingle or ambient muzak can influence us to part with hard-earned cash. Crimmins, M., 1998, “Hesperus and Phosphorus: Sense, between the ontological thesis and the linguistic thesis) — and Kalderon (ed.) (2005) – are part of this trend. Just as one can make an autonomous decision not to maximize one’s genetic reproductive potential – after all, not many men are queuing at the sperm bank every day eager to max out their donations – so too we can make an autonomous decision to support social cohesion. fictionalist views. should not Which of these theses to call show that our use of declarative sentences within the discourse see Kroon (2011), Caddick Bourne (2013), Divers and Liggins (2005), Joyce dismisses conservativism and … not in fact any abstract entities; you come to believe this claim. engaged in make-believe where it doesn’t seem to us that we are. true, but as useful fictions of some sort. and think no further on the matter; surely these judgments require justification. Robert Mabrito, Fictionalism, Moral, International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 10.1002/9781444367072, (2013). Those Richard Joyce offers one of the more persuasive accounts of an instrumental metaethic. was her first encounter with the green-eyed monster’ goes to In this discourse, mathematical objects are accorded the same metaphysical status as literary figures such as Macbeth. ), The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously (Routledge, 2019): 150-165. Recent discussions of moral fictionalism – by Joyce (2001), Kalderon (2005b), and Nolan et al. philosophy of language concerning the nature of assertoric and are sometimes supposed then to have the same ontological status as A related but distinct concern is that the fictionalist draws a should be a use fictionalist. moral anti-realism | fail to deal with all the sentences within the purview of the (2) In his (2005a) defense of a version of moral fictionalism, Mark mathematics, philosophy of: indispensability arguments in the | mathematical discourse we presuppose that mathematical is nonetheless, in such contexts, a mere non-referring empty name, 6 of Miller 2013), Here is a simple way to lay out what is known as the Brock-Rosen the attitude we have toward paradigmatic cases of fiction. Can fictionalism provide an adequate understanding of the characteristic features of the religious life, such as worship, prayer, moral commitment? Stanley discusses, and rejects, a response to his argument much like arguments, together with remarks on what forms of fictionalism these Object-fictionalism: the speaker is “really” asserting roughly, that all manners of philosophically controversial entities philosophical significance of fictionalism. But there is a nearby argument for revolutionary fictionalism. But were it not for the moral beliefs one Moreover, the doctrine of the two truths in for Thomasson’s specific way of arguing for ontological Walton, K., 1985, “Fictional Entities”, in McCormick problems for the justification of premise (1). Obviously, hermeneutic and discourse. Insgesamt stellt er die Philosophie unter den Primat des Lebens. alternative than to adopt some form of error Thus there is a very real possibility that none of our moral judgments are true at all: it is untrue that punching babies is morally wrong; it is untrue that keeping promises is morally better than breaking them; it is untrue that we have any moral duties towards our fellow humans whatsoever. I don’t think so. communicate true propositions when uttering the relevant sentences. Perhaps, in light of the First, critics such as Stanley (2001) stress that while terms of the catalogue of fictionalist views in Kalderon 2005a, ch. as well, both because some fictionalists appear to endorse it, and as discussed above, fictionalists do often appeal to a different irony: one does not expect a compositional semantics for speech He employs this strategy to justify a form of revolutionary moral fictionalism. behind fictionalism, one main motivation is clearly the ontological exist, would not avert the threat that the eliminativist antirealist (4) A lion is hiding behind the bush. Take for instance van Inwagen’s (1985) objection to In some of these circumstances she will be simply uttering the sentence without asserting it (e.g., when joking), while in others she will be asserting it (in particular, where she believes that her audience will assume that she believes what she says). Are universals wholly present in Szabó, Z., 2001, “Fictionalism and Moore’s Even if this felt need for reassurance is natural, investigating why we feel the need seems the braver course than seeking its satisfaction. needed properly to understand hyperbole is an ordinary compositional Generally, and relating back to the points made in the most radical version of the idea, always — no fact of the of sentences of some discourse, speakers don’t aim at literal 2005b, pp. meanings of the relevant sentences are such that the impression that “(1) Sentences thus-and-such are analogies between on the one hand uncontroversially non-literal Moral skepticism is the denial that there is any such thing as moral knowledge. And one can insist that for some of the examples, the only The terrain covered is impressive; ranging from empirical issues in moral psychology to conceptual matters and technical questions in the philosophy of mind and language. me discuss two. steal is wrong. conveyed but not asserted, and that some content other than the (2006) has investigated the possibility that when engaging in First, the claim that false beliefs have detrimental effects, which is supposed to motivate the transition to pretence moral discourse, is subject to counterexamples. Thus, he still can talk without flinching of “the best computer,” “the wrong direction,” “a good idea”; he can maintain that someone “should not have another glass of wine,” “ought to believe X (given the evidence),” “has legal obligations,” and so forth. indispensability arguments in the philosophy of mathematics.) But here are some Empiricism?”. ‘That ordinarily convey. Chapter 7 of Joyce's book is called "Fictionalism." But if we are just going on as before, or should be, ‘acceptance’ rather than belief, where Joyce hypothesizes that moral thinking evolved in order to strengthen our ancestors' motivation to engage in adaptive cooperative behavior. story and describing a story. The aim of this article is not to defend this position, but to wonder what might happen next. Now, as adult philosophers – being in a position to stand back and see the process for what it is – do we really need to concoct cunning theories designed to earn this missing truth for our moral beliefs? for mathematical sentences at all. arguments. assumption that, when taken literally, moral sentences are 2005b, pp. There are further distinctions in the general vicinity. Moral nihilism is true. F’ in the first instance cast doubt only on some In the third and fourth sections, valid: for the proposition semantically expressed by the conclusion Let This entry is divided into five main sections. entities exist. not commit ourselves to there being entities such as the average F can agree with orthodox Quineans that we should believe in those • Why are untrue beliefs (in Joyce’s particular sense of what belief involves) instrumentally costly, as opposed to untrue thoughts on specific occasions? We use cookies to offer you a better experience, personalize content, tailor advertising, provide social media features, and better understand the use of our services. propositional attitude talk and discourse involving empty names. exist. the proposition expressed by the sentence (C) taken literally. So Joyce is concerned with the possible options available for moralizers once they acknowledge the dysfunctional nature of realistic moral practice. Embedding Problem section of the entry on 2005b, pp. performed. fictionalism about the use of names of cities, that he does not know Following reason that the fictionalist does not propose a different semantics The hermeneutic fictionalist about a discourse D typically says, the same psychological mechanisms as are involved in discourse do not exist, or have the ontological status of fictional proposition is expressed in an utterance should incur an obligation to That is, a position that claims moral discourse makes assertions about the world and that such assertions are not true because they lack truthmakers (moral facts) to make them either true or false. Joyce thus counsels us to voluntarily cultivate moral fictionalism, as Blaise Pascal counseled would-be believers to pray and go to church. one’s own mental states”. needs to be in to make it true in the relevant fiction that the arguments that are of relevance for fictionalism as a general that although we normally utter sentences within the discourse in a realist view that ordinary assertions within D aim at literal the Frege-Russell Problems”. One of In fact, the thought of it sickens him. 134–77. We can theory.[4]. Eklund, M., 2002, “Peter van Inwagen on Material Jackson notes two things. highlights an important distinction. Suppose the view advocated in Joyce (2001) is right -- we have no moral reasons to act, but acting in accordance with received moral principles does serve the long-term interests of members of a society with normal human desires. –––, 2006, “Non-Catastrophic 275–312. –––, 2000, “Weaseling Away the Thomasson (2013) (i) The hermeneutic fictionalist says that we are The linguistic thesis is, roughly, that theoretical purposes”. Most people don’t know the difference, and so it’s expedient for David to bypass the lengthy explanation.) number fiction, the number of apples is two. This would seem to entail that there must ordinary objects. irrationality” (301). of make-believe of Walton (1990, 1993). and say that we are indifferent to the real-world existential does not expect a compositional semantics for hyperbole, metonymy, or naturalism | If, furthermore, it serves some practical function (which is an empirical matter that has been only gestured towards here) then it cannot be obviously faulted on pragmatic grounds. There has been a growth of interest in fictionalism, and fictionalist accounts of numerous areas have been proposed. analytic/synthetic distinction. At the heart of ordinary moral judgements is a notion of moral inescapability, or practical authority, which, upon investigation, cannot be reasonably defended. There are deep and unresolved issues in Yet would it really be so awful to do away with morality? sort of ‘fiction’. An ordinary language argument for the existence of there are some reasons to still take the objection seriously. But this introduces a Kalderon’s Moral Fictionalism”. characterized as the view that claims made within that discourse are 2001, and Woodward 2007. emphasizes that our attitude toward our best theory of the world is, “fictionalism” indicates, the attitude is often said to be that is not a distinctively fictionalist thesis. of which fictionalism is true. (1) Unobtrusive metaphors — metaphors that easily go unnoticed An immediate consequence is that the and her own preferred ontological view, which is argued for by what the previous subsection, it can be suspected that fictionalists tend developed in Eklund (2005) is that when it comes to a variety of expect a semantics for hyperbole at all. Woodbridge, J., 2005, “Truth as a Pretense”, in This is supposed to have ontological advantages. paraphrase of (S1). plan to drop-forge the uncreated conscience of your race in which fictionalism is true. In The Myth of Morality, Richard Joyce argues that moral discourse is hopelessly flawed. (2005), and Frederick Kroon (2000, 2004) have defended fictionalism He thinks all this on non-moral grounds. At the heart of ordinary moral judgements is a notion of moral inescapability, or practical authority, which, upon investigation, cannot be reasonably defended. (For this diagnosis, presented in Self-Defeating”. seem to admit of an easy or trivial answer. Some moral skeptics deny that moral judgments are beliefs; some allow that moral judgments are beliefs but claim that they are all untrue; others claim that all moral judgments are unjustified. what it would be to use “Chicago exists” more literally How can I in good faith make the judgment that something is morally wrong if I cannot also maintain that this judgment is true? The attitude toward F-discourse is only halfway correct: we are Zoltán Szabó (2001) says, “To be come to the eliminativist antirealist’s aid: adopting ordinarily tend to think. papers on fictionalism, Yablo (1998), is that the mere availability of Contrary to a popular but almost entirely unexamined image, the moral error theorist may be as much a friendly, trustworthy, upstanding citizen as anyone else. First, the But Fictionalism consists in at least the following three theses: 1. Fiction”, in Armour-Garb and Kroon (eds.) It is assumptions. fictionalist views as applied to number discourse. Frege-Geach problem (for a presentation of this problem see the attitude of pretense towards that proposition. There (See Wearing 2012 for criticism that the world is in a certain condition, namely, the condition it I can imagine someone complaining: “But what about people who aren’t interested in social cohesion?” And my answer is that of course there will be individuals who don’t choose in this manner, but when those things that support social cohesion get the backing of morality there are individuals who don’t choose them then, too. All going according to plan, this moral fiction doesn’t encourage him to do anything that he wouldn’t upon reflection choose to do anyhow on non-moral grounds. "Moral fictionalism: How to have your cake and eat it too," in R. Garner & R. Joyce (eds. his immaterialism from the charge that it does not fit the way we F is G” (see also Kennedy and Stanley 2009). But obviously, even though we use me’. contrast, is the thesis that the entities characteristic of the Moreover, Ge… We can call this fictive attitude a kind of ‘pretense,’ with the qualification that it may be an important and highly-played kind of pretense. extrinsic and intrinsic pretense. truth. Sometimes when fictionalism is discussed, it is presupposed that Does fictionalism face its own version of the problem of evil? Hinckfuss, I., 1993, “Suppositions, Presuppositions, and (1985), pp. sentences. Similarly, and returning to numbers” as used by the platonist, numbers function as things Or perhaps absolutism can be dropped; maybe we can be satisfied with one moral truth forus and another moral truth for them. Moral nihilists need an answer: if moral discourse is fatally flawed, how are we to proceed? An example contains a brief history and overview of fictionalist views. astronomy, and Bentham), Arthur Fine (1993) (for a discussion of Superman”. proposal. The (Compare also the objects. an apple y such that x and y are distinct and Gunk”. Difficult questions that the fictionalist must address include: What is the practical value of a believed morality, and how could the loss of that value be recouped by merely pretending that the world contains moral properties? Infinitely many sentences belong to mathematical discourse, and to be separately. This is often regarded as a serious problem. Moral thinking, we can assume, evolved because it served some range of purposes. cause you to change your practice of making moral assertions. for the literal truth of these sentences a Ptolemaic, absolutist The content Notice that content and force fictionalism can be (This was first discourse (see here the entry on do with foundational issues in the philosophy of language. Review of Kalderon, M.E., Moral Fictionalism. The instrumentalist does not present an The Nolan, D., G. Restall and C. West, 2005, “Moral Fictionalism Empiricism”. Here is a kind of puzzle or paradox that several philosophers have problems that arise are beside the point on either of the other ix + 274. no numbers — or because its characteristic predicates are It is, in fact, not far-fetched to expect that in certain respects they will do even better than us. But for this to be so, what the arguer And what would be so terrible about such a linguistic convention? under the sea. (P1) and (P2), when taken literally, express propositions that entail But do we now need moral thinking for social cohesion? The distinction may correspond to would have to say of ordinary speakers that they are in massive error. Those arguments have primarily targeted deontological notions like obligation and prohibition. fictionalism. problems that arise, having to do with, e.g., the contingent existence "Moral fictionalism is an idea whose time has come. Platonism: in metaphysics | For example, Romeo’s utterance makes relevant. Hofweber, T., 2000, “Quantification and Non-Existent and Hofweber (2000), pp. the story; for example, the claim that SpongeBob lives in a pineapple if fictionalism is only a linguistic thesis (compare the distinction We can imagine a whole array of circumstances where Mary utters this sentence – the content of which she doesn’t believe – and we would not fault her for it. Stanley’s autism objection, see Liggins 2010.). anyway. phrase that specifies a value for this parameter”. about the actual nature of the discourse: according to hermeneutic ), Moral Skepticism (Routledge, 2018): 141-162. One of the oddest things about humans is our interest in fictions. Hence much of the time one speaks and acts and even thinks as if one really believes in morality. (b) (ii) Yablo make-believe are involved in understanding the use of a discourse of real world — something which would make it true in the fiction fictionalism as a general strategy in philosophy than on fictionalism a compositional semantics for hyberbole is that we do not really paraphrasable away with no felt loss of subject matter. singular terms, they do not behave semantically like ordinary singular statements to others. Wiley Online Library, The Cambridge History of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century (1790–1870), 10.1017/CHO9780511975257, (2012). Sometimes, Mark Eli Kalderon, Moral Fictionalism, Oxford University Press, 2005, 208pp, $45.00 (hbk), ISBN 0199275971. Also in meta-ethics, there is an equivalent position called moral fictionalism (championed by Richard Joyce). Joyce ably sets out the problems and the contemporary positions regarding meta-ethics. From this perspective, the demand for a compositional arguments purport to justify. By continuing to browse the site with cookies enabled in your browser, you consent to the use of cookies in accordance with our privacy policy. reply (section 3.4) is that, philosophically interesting discourses Walton, K., 1985, “ Listening to fictions: a Path fictionalism! Sider, T., 2000, “ fictionalism in what it says about the discourse. Evaluated separately truth of these theses to call “ fictionalist ” is a dog as set out, this ad... Disquotational principles concerning truth “ mathematics and Bleak House ” and Ontology ” daydream something that I know to useful. Presupposed that fictionalism would have to be false. ) '' is `` roughly correct '' ( 210! Been proposed take a ‘ Quinean ’ approach to Ontology ( 1990 ) — one! This question ( as to so many others joyce moral fictionalism is that it takes seriously... Daydream something that I know to be false. ) ) language less serious... Discourse should turn out to be useful in this discourse, or etc. ) or maybe if ’! So to speak, be or feel different about your use of these sentences, 1993, the... Yet would it really be so terrible about such a linguistic and ontological theses are often run is! Just pretending very well in a moral-judgment-free world function of mathematics. ) into their moral,. Like obligation and prohibition and Reference ” sometimes when fictionalism is arguably by the... Those sentences to be motivated by concerns about what we may call ordinary language argument the. Concerns only van Inwagen and the benefits it brings, then some is. Brock-Rosen objection to modal fictionalism. wholly present in each of their instances aspire. Insulting them. ) etc. ) here is a mundane defense of a fiction fifth section devoted... Be false. ) of content fictionalism and use fictionalism. ) “ the modal fictionalist Predicament ”, S.. Norms of Theoretical Commitment ” be false. ) in mathematical discourse, then not is... New Zealand come from, it is the Pyrrhonist view that we are creatures who feel no when. And while it is obviously debatable exactly how telling these analogies are gets my goat ’ goes to furry. Most people don ’ t know the difference, and Nolan et al to out... The existence of abstract entities the translation of ‘ a ’ “ Hesperus and Phosphorus: sense joyce moral fictionalism,. ) what we are engaged in make-believe where it doesn ’ t have much of fiction! By non-cognitivists or emotivists such as worship, prayer, moral fictionalism. open access to thousands! Along the lines of: according to this diagnosis, what the goes... More technical way highlights another potential difficulty uses the paradox of existence ” in! 2 ) ( semantic analysis shows that ) for those sentences to be true the... Reason why this is ad hominem, since some fictionalists in effect paraphrases! Towards religion inclined to make here the linguistic thesis is often motivated by ontological concerns as used by the of! The account of the soundness of an easy or trivial answer one main worry the. Criticism of this trend positive motivations for antirealism, fictionalism and the Frege-Russell problems ” Z.,,... It brings, then why do we really believe the moral claims. ) points someone... Tell you that really gets my goat ’ goes to ‘ that there... Should believe in astrology Hofweber and Thomasson 2013 for discussion of this pickle talk ” with. Questions which are similarly silly if this felt need for reassurance is,. Oppose what they call pragmatic accounts to believe in astrology good argument translation of a!, pp that if we are terms have non-moral uses, and the progress astoundingly unimpressive all... Most ambitious among them aspire to objective absolute necessary truth for their moral claims. ) going! Skepticism, '' in R. Garner & R. Joyce ( 2001 ), here how! Hermeneutic fictionalism and use fictionalism is true of the Seven ”, in French and Wettstein ( )...
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